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RECENT CASES

at the same time enable a defendant to properly defend himself
against the claim being made.
DAVID AXTMANN

IMPUTED
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The plaintiff was riding as a passenger in his own truck which
was being driven by his employee. The truck collided with
another truck owned by the defendant corporation and operated
by its employee. Plaintiff brought suit against the corporation to
recover for his own personal injuries and damage to his truck,
alleging negligence on the part of the defendant's driver. The defendant denied any negligence and alleged the contributory nei -igence of the plaintiff's driver which when imputed to the plaintiff
would bar recovery. The trial court instructed the jury that, if
they found the plaintiff's driver to be contributorily negligent, then
as a matter of law the contributory negligence would be imputed
to the plaintiff. The jury's verdict was in favor of the defendant
and judgment was rendered accordingly. The plaintiff appealed
to the Minnesota Supreme Court and argued that the doctrine of
imputed contributory negligence was unjust and ought to be abandoned. The Supreme Court held that, although the master may
have been vicariouslly liable for any injuries suffered by the third
party as a result of his servants negligence, the master can not
be barred from recovery for his own injuries and damages caused
by the negligent third party, even though the servant was contributorily negligent.
In reversing the lower court and granting a new trial, the
supreme court expressly limited its abandonment of the doctrine
of imputed contributory negligence to automobile negligence cases.'
Weber v. Stokely-Van Ccrnp, Inc., 274 Minn. 482, 144 N.W.2d 540
(1966).
The doctrine of imputed contributory negligence is the device
whereby the plaintiff is denied recovery against the defendant when
the negligence of another is "imputed" to the plaintiff because :f
1. -There wa a second issue decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court, that of.whether or not the procurring of affidavits from a juror after the trial, relating to the conduct
or discussions durtig deliberations. may be used to Impeach a verdict.. The tral COt ;S
conclusion, -based on atfidavits and counter-affidavits, that the alleged misconduct was
not sufficient to warrant a new 'trial, wan affirmed. This Issue will not be discussed
within this a-ticle.
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the existence of some relationship with the latter, usually agency
2
or employment.
Under the common law, liability for negligence is based upon
fault.8 However, the courts have permitted, where a certain
relationship exists between the parties, such as master and servant,4 a fiction to be created so as to impose liability upon the
master though he may not have personally participated in or had
knowledge of the servant's act.5 Such imposed liability is termed
"vicarious liability".6 It is the theoretic right to control the conduct of the servant which is the fiction and the foundation of the
7
doctrine of imputed negligence.
There are many reasons for imputing the negligence of a ,servant to his master in a suit by an injured third party,8 but
probably the most popular is to provide the injured person with a
financially responsible defendant. 9 One author phrased it as providing a "Deep Pocket" into which the injured plaintiff may reach
for compensation. 0
During the latter part of the 19th century the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence had its inception." In 1849 an "unfortunate" English decision imputed the negligence of the driver
of an omnibus to his passenger, who was injured through the
negligent operation of another vehicle. The passenger's right of
recovery for injuries suffered was precluded on the theory that
since the passenger had selected that particular means of conveyance he in fact became "identified" with its driver and a party
2
to the negligent act.1
In 1886, the United States Supreme Court, in deciding whether
the negligence of a public hack-driver would be imputed to his
2.

Henniss, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 26 TENN. L. Rlv. 531 (1959):
"As the doctrine assumes the plaintiff's innocence of actual negligence, imputed
negligence is the best understood as transferred negligence; See generally: Gregory,
Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Ngligence. 41 YALE L. J. 831 (1932) ; Lessler,
The Proposed Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory Negqigence. 20 FORDHAM
L. REv. vEF (1951) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAw or TORTS § 21.1 (1956) (referred to
as HARPER & JAMES, hereinafter) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 73 (3rd ed. 1964) (referred to as
PROSSER, hereinafter).
3. See HARPER & JAMES § 14.1; PRossEs § 74.
4. For the purposes of this article the term master will be synonomous with employer; also, servant with employee.
5. See HARPER & JAMES § 26.1; PROSSER § 68.
6. Supra note 5.
7. Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366 (1886).
8. Supra note 5.
9. Weber v. Stokely-Van-Camp, Inc., 274 Minn. 482, 144 N.W.2d 540 (1966) (dictum).
10. PROSSER § 68 n. 7.
11. Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., supra note 9, at 541 (dictum) ; PROSSER § 73.
12. Thorougood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (1849). This decision was
overruled by England's House of Lord's, within forty years, in Mills v. Armstrong (The
Bernia), 12 P.D. 58, 13 A.C. 1 (1888). But in the interim, various courts in the United
States specifically referred to the English decision as the basis for adopting the same
doctrine: Brown v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 31 Barb. 385 (N.Y. 1860) ; Lockhart et al. v. Lichtenthaler et al., 46 Pa. 151 (1865) ; Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 (1878) ; See
PROSSER § 73 for the comment that Thorogood v, Bryan was an "unfortunate" decision.
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passenger so as to bar recovery against a negligent third party,
expressly repudiated the English doctrine based upon its theory
of "identification".'
The Supreme Court refused to impute the
driver's negligence and declared that:
The passenger has no control over the driver or agent in
charge of the vehicle. And it is this right to control of the
agent which is the foundation of the doctrine that the
master is to be affected.by the acts of his servant. 14
In the absence of this relation, the imputation of [the
driver's] negligence to the passenger, where no1 5fault . . .
is chargeable to him, is against all legal rules.
The rule has evolved that where a vicarious relationship exists,
the negligence of the one, for example the servant, is imputed
to the master barring the latter's right of recovery even though
he is actually innocent of any fault. 1 The test which is used to
determine the existence of such a relationship is the so-called
"Both-Way test": 17 if the master is vicariously liable to a third
party due to the servants negligence he is also barred from recovery for any losses suffered as a result of his servant's contributory negligence.' 8
In the present case the plaintiff did not dispute the doctrine
of imputed negligence or vicarious liability itself, but rather, the
application of the "both-way" rule to the doctrine, which resulted
in the "universally accepted," 9 companion doctrine of imputed contributory negligence. The Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the
logic of applying the both-ways rule to the doctrine of imputed
13. Little v. Hackett, supra note 7; See oso PROSSER § 73 "The American cases which
accepted (the English doctrine) now have been overruled everywhere." Reiter v. Grober,
173 Wis. 493, 181 N.W. 739 (1921) ; Bunting v. Hagsett, 139 Pa. 363, 21 A. 31 (1890).
Michigan was the last state to abandon the idea: Bricker v. Green, 313 Mich. 218, 21
N.W.2d 106 (1946).
14. Little v. Hackett, supra note 7, at 376.
15. Little v. Hackett, supra note 7, at 375.
16. Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., supra note 9, at 542 (dictum).
.. 17. Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., supra note 9, at 542 n.3, "The term was probably
coined by Gregory, Vicarsius Responsibility and Contributory N cgigence. 41 YALE L. J.
831 (1932)".
18. Weber v. Stokey-Van Camp, Inc., supra note 9 (dictum)
Frankle v. Twedt, 234
Minn. .42, 45, 47 N.W.2d 482, 486 (1951). The Minnesota court made It quite clear when
It said: "On the basis of an agency relationship, the negligence of an agent is imputed
to his principal as a bar to the latter's right of recovery, in an action which he brings
against a third party, only when the nature of the agency relationship is such that the
principal would be subject to a vicarious liability as a defendant to another who may
have been injured by the agent's negligence." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 486 (1934) specifically adopted the both-way rule, where a master-servant relationship exists, and It
was incorporated into the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 486 (1965).
19. Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., supra note 9, at 542; e.g., Drewery v. -Daspit
Bros. Mariner Divers, Inc., 317 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Airline v. Brown, 190 F.2d 180
(5th Cir. 1951); Miller v. U.S., 196 F.Supp. 613 (Mass. 1961) ; Watts v. Safeway Cab,
193 Ark. 413, 100 S.W.2d 965 (1937) ; Hightower v. Landrum, 109 Ga. App. 510, 136
S.E.2d 425 (1964); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Tomlinson. 373 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. Ct. App.
1964); Willis v. Grain Dealers Mutual insurance Co.,-La.-, 185 So.2d 912 (1966);

108

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

negligence in the master-servant situation, just as it had in previous cases when the doctrine based on bailor-bailee relationships
was repudiated. 20 The court concluded that:
[T]he time has come to discard this rule which is defensible only on the grounds of its antiquity. In doing so we
realize we may stand alone, but a doctrine so untenable
should not be21 followed so as to bar recovery of one entitled
to damages.
The development of the automobile with its corresponding
growth of auto accident problems, and the plight of uncompensated
accident victims led to the increasing pressure for providing financially responsible defendants. The response to this pressure was
the extention of vicarious liability and the doctrine of imputed
negligence to other situations where the negligence of the driver
is imputed to another exclusive of any actual agency or vicarious
relationship. 22 One such extention was by the court-made "familycar" or "family-purpose" doctrine, which according to Prosser, was
adopted by half of the states, 2 including North Dakota. 24 Under
the "family-car" doctrine, the head of the household, usually the
father, is liable for the negligence of any member of the household who injures another while operating the family car within the
2 5
purpose for which the vehicle was intended.
Other jurisdictions enacted "automobile consent statutes" which
imposed liability on the automobile owners for the negligence of
26
anyone operating the car with the owner's consent.
The courts are not in agreement as to whether or not the bothway rule is to be applied to the family-car doctrine, 27 or to the
Emrnco Ins. Co. v. California Co., 101 So.2d 628 (La. Ct. App. 1958); Peterson v.
Schneider, 154 Neb. 303, 47 N.W.2d 863 (1951) ; George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374,
86 A.2d 8

(1951) ; Clemens v. O'Brien, 85 N.J. Super. 404, 204 A.2d 895

West, 260, N.C. 182, 132 S.E.2d 357
LA. L.

(1964) ; Forga v.

(1963); James, Imputed Contributory Negligence. 14

REv. 340 (1954).

20. Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., Inc., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406 (1943)
Held, the bailee's negligence is not imputed to the bailor in an action by the latter
against a
(1949)

;

third party;

followed

by, Jacobson v.

See generally RESTATEMENT

Daily, 228

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§

Minn. 201,

489

36

N.W.2d 711

(1965).

Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 274 Minn. 482, 487, 144 N.W.2d 540, 545

(1966).

21.

Weber v.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

HARPER & JAMES § 23.6 n.4; 14 LA. L. REv. 340 supra note 19.
Jacobsen v. Daily, supra note 20; PROSSER § 72; 40 U. DET. L. J. 268 (1962).
Ulman v. Lindeman, 44 N.D. 36, 176 N.W. 25 (1919).
Supra note 23.
An example of such is Minnesota's statute which provides that: " . . . (any

operator who has either the) . . . expressed or implied . . . (consent of the owner)
" MINN. STT. ANN. § 17.54 1960).
. . . shall . . . be deemed the agent of the owner ....

This statute supersedes the family-purpose doctrine which had previously been adopted
by Minnesota in

(1966).

Jacobsen v.

Daily, supra note 20; See also IOWA CODE ANN. §

321.493

For a general discussion of various consent statutes see York v. Day's, Inc., 158

Me. 441, 140

A.2d 730

(1950).

27. Lucey v. Allen, 44 R.I. 379, 117 A. 539 (1922), Held, the contributory negligence
of the husband-driver is Imputed to the wife owner-passenger to bar her recovery under
the family purpose

rule. Michaelsohn v.

Smith, 113

N.W.2d 571, 574

(N.D. 1962),

Held,

that any contributory negligence of the owner's minor son was not imputable to the
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automobile consent statutes .2
In the jurisdictions which have consent statutes, it is a ques-

tion of statutory construction, whether or not the liability imposed
upon the consenting owner is to be imputed to him when he is
the plaintiff in the suit. Some courts, in interpreting their respective statutes, have determined, just as North Dakota did under
its family-purpose rule, 2! that the sole purpose of the statute is
to provide a "deep pocket" for the injured party.30 Based upon
this construction the courts have reasoned that when the owner
is the injured party there is no need of a "deep pocket", therefore, no legislative 1 purpose would be served by imputing the negligence both-ways.
California is one jurisdiction which has no problem interpreting
its consent statute, for the statute expressly states that the negligence of the consent driver "shall be imputed to the owner for
all purposes of civil damages. 81 2 One author points out that such
a statute:
leads to the paradox that a rule which departed from
the common law in response to an urge towards wider
liability is used to curtail liability by expanding the scope
of a defense to it.a3
owner under the family purpose doctrine. The whole purpose of the invention has been
to protect injured plaintiffs against financial irresponsibility, rather than to cut down on
their recoveries. With this view the court said that "To extend the doctrine to deny the
right of a non-negligent car owner to recover from a negligent driver of another car
(through the application of the both-way rule) . . . would defeat the public policy the
doctrine is intended to serve."
28. See generally Mills v. Gabriel, 259 App. Div. 60, 18 N.Y.S.2d 78, aff'd. 284 N.Y.
751, 13 N.E.2d 512 (1940), Held, the both-way rule does not apply; McMartin v. Saemisch, 254 Iowa 45, 116 N.W.2d 491 (1962), HeKd5 the contributory negligence of the consent driver is not Imputable to the owner under the automobile owners consent statute;
IOWA CODE ANN. 321.493. York v. Day's, Inc., supra note 26. The court reasoned that
since the owner would not be liable at common law for the negligence of a consent driver absent any special relationship, to construe the statute both-ways without an expressed
legislative provision would be to make an innovation upon the common law. In 1931
a New York court viewed the application of the both-ways rule as broadening the scope
of the doctrine of contributory negligence which is contrary to the "modern trend of the
law . . . (toward limiting) . . . the effect of that doctrine." Gouchee v. Wagner, 232
App. Div. 401, 250 N.Y.S. 102, 105 (1931). Cf. National Trucking & Storage Co. v. Driscoll, 64 A.2d 304, 305 (D.C. Munic. App. 1949), under a statute similar to Minnesota's
in that the "operator (is) deemed to be the agent of the owner . . .",the driver's negligence is imputed both-ways. The rationale of the colurt was that if the driver is to be
deemed the owner's agent by statute, then under the common law principles of agency
the owner would be liable whether plaintiff or defendant. For a discussion of various consent statutes, see note, 31 NoTRE DAME L. 724 (1956).
29. Michaelsohn v. Smith, supra note 27.
30. Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 74 N.W.2d 212 (1956) ; Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228
Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711 (1949) ; Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., Inc., 215 Minn.
394, 10 N.W.2d 40,6 (1943).
31. Supra note 30.
32. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17150 (West 1960) ; See generally Lambert v. Southern
Counties Gas Co., 52 Cal. App.2d 327, 340 P.2d 608, 611 (1959), "[T]he phrase 'all purposes of civil damages' indicates application of the statute to 'all cases where the rights
and obligations of the owner are involved in civil action for damages' . . . regardless of
whether the owners be plaintiffs . . . or whether the owner be the defendant." See also
Milgate v. Wraith, 19 Cal. App.2d 297, 121 P.2d 10 (1942).
33. HARPER & JAMES § 23.6 at 1274: The argument which is made in favor of hold-
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Although some of the courts have construed consent statutes

as imputing negligence only one-way,34 some have held that the
mere presence of the owner in the car at the time of the accident
pre-supposes the concomitant control or right to control upon his
part.

Consequently,

the owner will be barred from recovery on

that basis, apart from statute, even though the owner was sitting
in the back seat,35 or was an invalid.36
A recent decision, however, has analyzed the factual relationship of the occupants of the car, and the owner's presence does
not establish, as a matter of law, a right of control in the owner. 7
The present trend is toward a rule more consistent with the facts
of life today.38 Before the contributory negligence of a driver will
be imputed to a passenger-owner, there must be, not only some
right of control over the driver or an intention to control, but
also actual control or an attempt to exercise such control.

9

Thus,

in the case where the owner was a passenger asleep on the back
seat at the time of the collision, the negligence of the driver of
the auto was not imputed to the owner.40 Similarily, in a case
where the owner-passenger did not have a driver's license and
did not know how to drive, the driver's contributory negligence was
not imputed to the owner." In New York "the application of the

doctrine of imputed negligence depends upon circumstances
2
olved and must yield to reason."'

in-

North Dakota follows those jurisdictions which take a realistic

approach in applying the doctrine of imputed negligence.

In a

recent North Dakota decision the instant case was relied upon
when the Supreme Court of North Dakota found reversible error
in a trial court's instruction that "There is a presumption...
ing the owner liable both-ways is that there is a second purpose to be served under the
consent statutes. This secondary aim is to induce a degree of care in the car owners in
selecting persons to whom they entrulst the car: National Trucking & Storage Co. v.
Driscoll, supra note 28. The counter-nrgument to this is that the liability which the
statute imposes on the owner is the strongest incentive to that end, and little will be
added to it by cutting the innocent. off from recovery for his own property damage.
34. Mills v. Gabriel; York v. Day's, Inc.; Gouchee v. Wagner, supra note 28.
35. GouchEe v. Wagner, sut'a note 28.
36. Standard Oil v. Thompson, 189 Ky. 830, 226 S.W. 368 (1920).
37. Linder v. State, 268 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1966).
38. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Caster, 216 A.2d 6S9 (Del. 1966). Linder v. State, supra
note 37; Jasper v. Freitag, 145 N.W.2d 879 (N.D. 1966) ; Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp,
Inc., 274 Minn. 482, 144 N.W.2d 540 (1966) ; Parker v. McCartney, 216 Ore. 283. 838
P.2d 371 (1959).
39. Johnson v. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 222 Ore. 377, 352 P.2d 1-091
(1960).
40. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Caster, suvra note 38.
41. Linder v. State, slipra note 37 ; Parker v. McCartneY, supra note 38.
42. Linder v. State, s.rao note 37: "To say a person who never has driven nor was
licensed to drive an autoniobile had the leg,,l right to control the operation of an automobile being driven by an experienced and licensed driver is not in the interest of the
public safety. We cannot Ignore completely the practical considerations involved in the
operation of vehicles on the highways and find he could have exercised control over the
operation of the automobile."
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that an owner present in his or her car has the power to control
it.""' As pointed out by both the North Dakota court and the
Minnesota court, in the instant case:
the realities of the operation of a vehicle on a highway
cannot be overlooked in dealing with the rights and obligations of persons in the car. Nothing could be more dangerous,
while operating a car in congested traffic, than to permit
the master or owner, riding as a passenger in his car, to
interfere constantly with the driving of the car. To do so
would be the clearest evidence of active negligence on the
part of such owner-passenger.44
It was with this
Court abandoned the
in automobile cases.
alize the rule . . . 4
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

view of reality that the Minnesota Supreme
doctrine of imputed contributory negligence
The court could find "[N]o way to rationwhich:

Pormitted liability without fault.
Was based upon a fiction of theoretic right of control...
Denied a remedy to an injured innocent person..
Absolved from liability a person whose negligence has
resulted in harm...

without any compensating social end, being served.
It is submitted that although the courts should strive to be as
realistic as possible and ^avoid archaic fictions, as the Minnesota
Supreme Court did in the present case,. they should also, prior to
abandoning a rule of law, reviewv the principles upon which that
rule has developed. 'One basic theory or principle underlying the
doctrine of imputed contributory negligence and the concept of a
master's being vicariously liable for the negligent acts of his servants is that, while an employee is engaged in the performance
of his duties, he is, in effect, in the furtherance of an enterprise
which the employer has set in motion for his own monetary gain.
Any liabilities for wrongs committed during the functioning of this
enterprise should be borne by the same. Any losses suffered by
the enterprise, as a result of any negligence attributable to the
43. Jasper v. Freitag, supra note 38 at 885. The injured plaintiff was the ownerPassenger in her auto which was being driven by her husband when it collided with the
rear of an oil truck on a public highway. The court at 886 held that "[T]he question
submitted to the jury . . . should have been whether, under the circumstances of this case.
the plaintiff was negligent in failing to control the driving of her husband, not whether
the plaintiff, as owner, had the right to control."
44. Supra note 38, at 886.
46. Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., supra note 38, at 645. Although the court has
expressly limited this decision and the abandonment of the doctrine of Imputed contributory negligence to automobile cases, it has expressly left the door open to (O)ther
situations where the same result should follow . . . ."
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enterprise, should be absorbed as a cost of that enterprise. This
loss is not to be shifted to a negligent defendant who under the
common law doctrine of contributory negligence, would normally
have an affirmative defense against such a transfer. This being
the net result of the present decision, then, the overall effect
is not only the weakening of the common law doctrine of contributory negligence, but also the erosion of the foundation upon which
the concept of vicarious liability of a master rests.
DANIEL J. McALEER
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OF STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT-A customer who was
injured when a soft drink bottle fell from a cardboard six-pack
carton as she attempted to remove it from a shelf in a grocery
store brought an action for personal injuries. Subsequently, the
grocery store was awarded indemnity against the bottler for any
sum it might be ordered to pay the customer. The court awarded
plaintiff two thousand dollars on the new strict liability doctrine
with one vigorous dissent attacking this new doctrine. Kroger Co.
v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Kentucky 1967).

LUTENESS

The Kentucky Supreme Court faced the problem of strict liability in tort and had to determine the extent of liability which a
manufacturer is to be held in evidence of a defect in his product.
In other words, whether or not to distinguish between the theory
of absolute liability such as is found in cases dealing with ultrahazardous activities, or dangerous animals 2 and the strict or
"special" liability of a manufacturer to the ultimate user or consumer?
In the United States, the law of products liability has developed
along various legal theories from the old doctrine of caveat emptor
or "let the buyer beware." Until recently the notable characteristic of all these advancements toward increased seller's liability
was that they required fault. The order of theories tending to
increase the liability included: express warranty with privity; negligence in the absence of privity in inherently dangerous goods;
express warranty without privity; and, lastly, implied warranty
without privity. Since 1960, a few jurisdictions have taken a dras1.
2.

Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App.2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954).
Zurek v. Fredericks. 138 F.2d 689 (3rd Cir. 1943).

